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I. BASIC STRUCTURE AND TAKE-UP OF WELLNESS PROGRAMS
Despite spawning a broad empirical literature and a six-billion-dollarper-year industry, no formal or universally accepted definition of a
“wellness program” exists. 1 In reviewing the workplace-wellness market for
a report the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) commissioned, scholars at the
RAND Corporation broadly defined a workplace-wellness program as “an
employment-based activity of employer-sponsored benefit aimed at
promoting health-related behaviors (primary prevention or health
promotion) and disease management (secondary prevention).” Initiatives
†

This project was supported by grant number T32HS000055 from the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality. The content is solely the responsibility of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions or policies of the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Boston
University, Harvard University, Indiana University, or University of Michigan.

1.

RAND CORP., DO WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS SAVE EMPLOYERS MONEY? (2014); RAND
CORP., WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS STUDY: FINAL REPORT 2 (2013) [hereinafter FINAL
REPORT].
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targeting primary prevention are also sometimes called “lifestyle
management” programs, a term used throughout this paper. 2
Screening activities, such as health-risk appraisals and biometric
screenings, are the most common elements of wellness programs and
frequently serve as the entry point for lifestyle and disease interventions.
Health-risk appraisals are self-reported surveys with questions about health
behaviors such as eating habits, exercise, smoking, and stress, while
biometric screens collect clinical data, like blood pressure, glucose, and
body-mass index. A minority of employers offer only screening activities,
without follow-up interventions. 3
Lifestyle management targets risk factors for chronic disease, and such
programs are oriented toward preventing chronic diseases. The most
ubiquitous preventive interventions focus on nutrition, weight
management, fitness, and smoking cessation; in 2012, over seventy percent
of lifestyle-management programs offered these components. About half
also offered some type of support for alcohol- and substance-use disorders
and stress management. 4
Specific program design varies widely by employer; the menu of
available lifestyle interventions includes subsidized gym memberships,
onsite weight-management group meetings, or telephone counseling to
help employees quit smoking. Environmental changes to the workplace
designed to encourage healthier behavior—putting more nutritious food in
vending machines and the cafeteria or offering on-site vaccinations and
fitness activities—could also be considered lifestyle interventions. 5 A
defining feature of lifestyle management is that the initiatives are available
to all participants; employees need not qualify in order to participate in
these components of a wellness program.
By contrast, disease-management programs are limited to employees
with manifest chronic conditions, such as diabetes, heart disease, asthma,
or depression. 6 Disease-management interventions are typically
individually tailored and coordinated with the employee’s personal
physician; they aim to improve health through better medication
adherence and bolstered patient self-care knowledge and ability. 7
Disease-management and lifestyle-management programs are
sometimes administered separately, and employers may offer one type of
intervention without the other.8 Historically, lifestyle-management
2.

FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.

3.

Id. at 26.

4.

Id. at 31.

5.

Id. at xvi; Id. at 23.

6.

Id. at 31.

7.

John P. Caloyeras et al., Managing Manifest Diseases, But Not Health Risks, Saved
PepsiCo Money Over Seven Years, 33 HEALTH AFF. 124, 125-126 (2014)

8.

FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 33.
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programs have been more prevalent: according to a 2015 survey, eightyone percent of large employers—those with more than two hundred
workers—offered some sort of lifestyle management as part of a wellness
program, compared to the sixty-eight percent that offered disease
management. This gap is even wider among small firms, where forty-nine
percent offered lifestyle interventions; only thirty-two percent reported
that disease management was available in their programs. 9
Firms frequently offer financial incentives to encourage employee
participation in wellness programs. The Affordable Care Act has expanded
the scope of incentives available to employers, as detailed in Part IV. The
incidence of incentives, however, is not distributed evenly across types of
wellness initiatives. Nearly one-third of all employers with health benefits
offer incentives to workers or require them to complete a health-risk
assessment; this rate is much higher among large firms than small firms. 10
Disease management is the least likely component of wellness programs to
be subject to incentives. 11 This may be related to concerns about targeting
incentives specifically toward individuals diagnosed with chronic diseases;
this paper will further examine that tension in Part VI.

II. THE CONCEPTUAL CASE FOR WELLNESS PROGRAMS
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimate that
eighty-six percent of national health expenditures could be attributed to
treatment for chronic medical conditions in 2010, representing over $2.2
trillion in one year alone. 12 Chronic conditions—including hypertension,
depression, diabetes, and heart disease—account for seven out of ten
deaths each year in the United States. 13 In addition to being common and
costly, chronic conditions are often preventable. Many conditions are
associated with adverse risk behaviors like poor nutrition, inadequate
physical activity, and alcohol and tobacco use. In theory, diminishing or
eliminating these adverse behaviors should reduce the prevalence of
chronic disease.
Over recent decades, chronic disease has become more commonplace,
and the burden has shifted from the elderly to include more working-age
adults. One analysis suggests that the number of non-elderly adults with at

9.

KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, 2015 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS,
at Summary of Findings 7 (2015).

10.

Id. at 6.

11.

FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at xxii.

12.

Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/chronicdisease/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2017).

13.

Id.
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least one chronic condition increased by over twenty-five percent from
1997 to 2006. 14
Given that fifty-nine percent of Americans aged nineteen to sixty-four
had employer-sponsored insurance in 2014, some of the financial burden
of chronic disease is borne by firms that provide health coverage as part of
a compensation and benefits package. 15 Direct costs manifest in the form
of healthcare expenses that accrue from providing health coverage. Firms
with employees who seek relatively more—or relatively more expensive—
care bear those costs through higher insurance premiums if they purchase
insurance, or higher medical spending if they self-insure.
Indirectly, chronic conditions can also increase absenteeism—missing
work for health-related reasons—and “presenteeism”—working while sick,
leading to reduced productivity. Some analyses have suggested that these
indirect costs are substantial. One survey administered by
PricewaterhouseCoopers found that absenteeism and presenteeism are up
to four times higher for individuals with chronic disease than for those
without. 16 A separate report from the Milken Institute suggested that these
indirect costs actually exceed direct health expenditures. 17
Among the privately insured, most of the ten conditions for which
spending grew the fastest between 1987 and 2009—including mental
disorders, pulmonary disease, hyperlipidemia, and diabetes—were chronic
diseases. 18 Over one-third of the increase in spending on such conditions is
attributable to an increase in the number of people receiving treatment. 19
In 2012, investigators evaluated the economic impact of ten common,
modifiable health risk factors, including blood pressure, total cholesterol,
obesity, blood glucose levels, tobacco use, and physical inactivity. 20 The
authors reported that these ten factors were associated with over twenty

14.

Catherine Hoffman & Karyn Schwartz, Eroding Access Among Nonelderly U.S.
Adults with Chronic Conditions: Ten Years of Change, 27 HEALTH AFF. W340, W342
(2008).

15.

Health Insurance Coverage of Adults 19-64, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/adults-19-64/?currentTimeframe=0
(last
visited Feb. 18, 2017).

16.

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS’ HEALTH RESEARCH INST., THE PRICE OF EXCESS: IDENTIFYING WASTE
IN HEALTHCARE SPENDING 7 (2008).

17.

ROSS DEVOL ET AL., AN UNHEALTHY AMERICA: THE ECONOMIC BURDEN OF CHRONIC DISEASE 7
(2007).

18.

Kenneth E. Thorpe, Treated Disease Prevalence and Spending Per Treated Case
Drove Most of the Growth in Health Care Spending in 1987-2009, 32 HEALTH AFF.
851, 856 (2013).

19.

Id.

20.

Ron Z. Goetzel et al., Ten Modifiable Health Risk Factors are Linked to More than
One-Fifth of Employer-Employee Health Care Spending, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2474, 2476
(2012).
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percent of total employer-employee health spending. 21 At the individual
level, being at high risk for depression was most strongly correlated with
increased medical spending among the ten risk factors evaluated. On
average, employees at high risk for depression had medical spending that
was forty-eight percent higher than their counterparts who were not. High
blood glucose, high blood pressure, and obesity were also strong drivers of
health spending; those risk factors were associated with health spending
increases of 31.8 percent, 31.6 percent, and 27.4 percent, respectively,
compared to patients who did not exhibit these risk factors.
In principle, health expenditures associated with modifiable behavior
are health expenditures that might be avoided. Wellness programs tempt
employers with an alluring promise: they can help employees get and stay
healthy, leading to increased time at work, improved productivity, and
reduced health spending. It is a promise that employers believe in: some
forty-three percent of surveyed employers believe that wellness programs
deliver positive returns on investment. 22 Others are more reserved in their
confidence about financial returns, but nonetheless see the programs as
effective recruitment and retention tools. 23

III: WHAT THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT CHANGED
For legal purposes, wellness programs come in two essential forms.
Participatory wellness programs offer employees a financial incentive
based only on their participation. 24 Employees might receive a reward, for
instance, if they fill out a health assessment or attend a smoking-cessation
class. 25 The reward can take a variety of forms: a premium discount or
rebate, waived or reduced cost-sharing, or the elimination of a surcharge. 26
Alternatively, employees might be penalized for failing to participate.
Health-contingent wellness programs require employees to achieve healthrelated targets in order to receive the financial incentive. 27 Employees

21.

Id. at 2474.

22.

FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.

23.

See The Business of Healthy Employees: A Survey of Workplace Health Priorities,
VIRGIN PULSE, 10 (2014), https://www.shrm.org/ResourcesAndTools/hrtopics/benefits/Documents/PulsePaper_
BusinessHealthyEmployees2014.pdf
(finding 88 percent of employees find wellness programs an important factor
when seeking employment).

24.

FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 2

25.

EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET: THE AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT AND WELLNESS PROGRAMS (2014) [hereinafter FACT SHEET], available at
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/ouractivities/resource-center/fact-sheets/fswellnessprogram.pdf.

26.

FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at xxi.

27.

FACT SHEET, supra note 25.
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might, for example, have to visit the gym a certain number of times each
month or keep their blood pressure under control.
On their face, participatory wellness programs treat all employees
alike. Health-contingent programs, however, discriminate among
employees based on factors related to their health. That, in turn, creates a
potential conflict with laws that aim to prevent employers from
discriminating against their sickest employees in the provision of health
insurance. Most prominently, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) prohibits employers from creating
eligibility rules or adjusting employee premiums based on “health statusrelated factors.” 28 Without an exception, HIPAA would have precluded
employers from adopting health-contingent wellness programs. To enable
such programs, Congress crafted an exception that allowed employers to
condition up to twenty percent of the cost of coverage upon successfully
meeting wellness standards.
Enthusiasm for wellness programs grew over the next decade, spurred
in particular by reports from companies like Safeway, which claimed that
adopting a wellness program allowed it to hold its healthcare costs
constant. 29 It did not matter that those reports were, in fact, wildly
misleading; a 2005 restructuring of its employee-benefit plan accounted for
the spending reductions, not a wellness program. 30 Wellness programs had
captured Congress’s imagination.
In 2010, Congress used the Affordable Care Act to relax HIPAA’s
strictures. 31 Under current law, employers are permitted to make thirty
percent of an employee’s premiums contingent on achieving health
objectives and up to fifty percent on tobacco cessation. 32 The ACA further
gives the Secretaries of the Treasury, the Departments of Labor, and Health
and Human Services authority to increase this general limit to fifty percent
of the cost of coverage. 33

IV. THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE: KEY FINDINGS AND CRITIQUES
Most of the numerous studies on the efficacy of employer-based
wellness programs suffer from serious methodological shortcomings. Some
are little more than thinly-veiled promotional materials pulled together at
28.

29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(1) (2012).

29.

Steven A. Burd, How Safeway Is Cutting Health-Care Costs, WALL ST. J. (June 12,
2009), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124476804026308603.

30.

David S. Hilzenrath, Misleading Claims about Safeway Wellness Incentives Shape
POST
(Jan.
17,
2010),
Health-Care
Bill,
WASH.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/15/AR2010
011503319_pf.html.

31.

See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(a) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j) (2012).

32.

42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A).

33.

Id.
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the wellness industry’s behest. But good studies do exist and, when
considered together, they paint a reasonably consistent picture of wellness
programs’ performances, or lack thereof.
To bring that picture into focus, we will examine the available research
from two perspectives. We will start with several studies that rigorously
evaluate the experience of individual firms with wellness programs.
Sensitive to the limitations of studies that focus on a single firm, however,
we then step back and examine several meta-analyses that have helped
frame contemporary discussion around employer-based wellness
initiatives. The message of these studies, taken together, is clear. Wellness
programs aimed at improving employee lifestyles yield little, if any, savings.
Programs that focus on managing employees’ chronic diseases, however,
hold substantially more promise.
Experience of individual employers

The three studies considered below feature large employers—Johnson
& Johnson, PepsiCo, and the University of Minnesota—that have
undertaken periodic analyses of their wellness programs. In all three cases,
the most recent analysis was published after 2010. Conclusions from
individual studies must be drawn with caution; findings from one employer
may not be generalizable to other institutions. This section is not intended
to be comprehensive—meta-analyses offer a more holistic picture—but is
representative of a few key issues in the literature: the effects of diseasemanagement versus lifestyle interventions, the importance of longer-time
horizons for elucidating the impact of wellness programs, and the nature of
a positive return-on-investment (“ROI”) study.
A.

Johnson & Johnson

The Johnson & Johnson family of companies has offered workplace
wellness initiatives since 1979. 34 In its current form, the firm’s Live for Life
program includes lifestyle components— reimbursement for gym
memberships, weight-loss program memberships, and computerized
coaching, among others—in addition to chronic disease management. The
company offered a five-hundred-dollar incentive for employees who
completed a health-risk assessment and participated in follow-up
programs; the five hundred dollars were a credit that could be applied
toward a worker’s health insurance premium.
Researchers, including two senior executives from Johnson & Johnson,
conducted an analysis that compared Johnson & Johnson’s health costs
against those from similar, de-identified large firms. 35 The sixteen
comparison companies varied in their wellness program offerings. Johnson
& Johnson employees were “matched” to employees of other firms along
34.

Rachel M. Henke et al., Recent Experience in Health Promotion at Johnson &
Johnson: Lower Health Spending, Strong Return on Investment, 30 HEALTH AFF. 490,
490 (2011).

35.

Id. at 491.
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dimensions of age, sex, geographic region, and health-plan type. Employees
were not matched on comorbidities or other observable measures of health
status, but the analysis adjusted for the Charlson Comorbidity Index, an
aggregate measure of chronic-disease burden, 36 as well as psychiatric
diagnoses and the richness of the employer’s insurance plan. As with all
observational studies, it is possible that meaningful but unobservable
differences remain, which could bias results.
Relative to comparison firms, Johnson & Johnson experienced 3.7
percent lower annual growth in health care expenditures over the 2002 to
2008 study window. This analysis did not differentiate between whether
employees participated in lifestyle-management or disease-management
components of the program, so inferences about the sources of savings
cannot be drawn easily from this study alone. Assuming that health costs
otherwise would have grown at rates similar to their peers, the study
estimated that Live for Life saved Johnson & Johnson between $1.88 and
$3.92 for every dollar spent, depending on assumptions about
administrative costs. 37 It is unclear why the analysis used a range of proxy
costs, instead of calculating ROI using the actual cost of program
administration.
B.

PepsiCo

A seven-year evaluation of PepsiCo’s wellness program provides one of
the longest study time horizons in the literature. 38 The company introduced
Healthy Living, a wellness program that offered both lifestyle- and diseasemanagement elements, in 2003. Healthy Living provided five lifestylemanagement programs in 2011, targeting fitness, nutrition management,
weight management, stress management, and smoking cessation. 39
Disease management was offered to employees that had at least one of the
following ten chronic conditions: asthma, atrial fibrillation, chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease, congestive heart failure, coronary artery
disease, diabetes, hyperlipidemia, hypertension, lower-back pain, or
stroke. 40
For the lifestyle-management program, investigators considered seven
years of program data following two baseline years; for disease
management, they had eight years of program data following one baseline
year. 41 Program participants were matched to nonparticipants within the
company on a number of variables, including age, sex, geographic location,
36.

Mary Charlson et al., The Charlson Comorbidity Index Can Be Used Prospectively
to Identify Patients Who Will Incur High Future Costs, 9 PLOS ONE 1, 2 (2014).

37.

Henke et al., supra note 34, at 495.

38.

Caloyeras et al., supra note 7, at 125.

39.

Id.

40.

Id. at 125-126.

41.

Id. at 125.
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medical costs, and comorbidities. 42 The authors aimed to ensure that
changes in health spending were not attributable to any observable ex ante
differences between employees that did and did not participate in the
wellness program. By comparing employees within the firm, the authors
also assured that the analysis was not confounded by factors that might
vary across companies.
The analysis found a $1.46 overall ROI, meaning that for every dollar
invested in the program, PepsiCo saved $1.46 in health costs. However,
savings were not balanced evenly across the lifestyle-management and
disease-management programs; the disease-management program
accounted for all net savings. For each dollar invested in the lifestylemanagement program, PepsiCo only saved $0.48, meaning that the lifestyle
management resulted in a net loss to the firm, even after accounting for
changes in self-reported absenteeism. 43 By contrast, the return for disease
management alone was $3.78. 44 Fewer employees participated in disease
management than lifestyle management. The authors noted that the
disease-management participants who also participated in the lifestylemanagement program demonstrated significantly higher savings overall,
suggesting that there may be an interaction effect and that targeting
lifestyle-management programs toward employees with manifest chronic
disease may improve their ROI.
C.

University of Minnesota

John A. Nyman and his coauthors have published multiple papers
evaluating the University of Minnesota’s health-promotion program at
various stages after its 2006 implementation. The program included a
wellness assessment with an incentive for completion; using results from
the wellness assessment, health coaching was available to enrollees who
were identified to have a risk factor, and disease management was available
for enrollees identified as having one or more chronic diseases. 45 Additional
lifestyle components included a 10,000-step program and web-based
health resources. 46
The analysis used baseline data from 2004 through 2006 and tracked
average monthly expenditures, comparing employees who participated in
at least one of the program components —wellness assessment, lifestyle
management, or disease management—against employees who did not
42.

Id. at 126.

43.

Id. at 128.

44.

Id.

45.

John A. Nyman et al., The Effectiveness of Health Promotion at the University of
Minnesota: Expenditures, Absenteeism, and Participation in Specific Programs, 52
J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 269, 272 (2010).

46.

OF
MINNESOTA,
Walking
Program:
10k
a
Day,
UNIVERSITY
https://humanresources.umn.edu/exercise-and-fitness/walking-program
(last
visited Mar. 18, 2017).
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participate in the program. 47 Employees were not “matched” in this
analysis, but the study used a strong econometric design to control for the
presence of specific risk factors and chronic diseases. In the first two years
of the program, the investigators determined that the lifestylemanagement program did not reduce health expenditures, while the
disease-management program did. 48 However, the disease-management
program savings were not sufficient over this time period to overcome the
cost of administering both programs. 49
In the third year, the program delivered a positive ROI, generating
$1.76 in savings for every dollar invested in the program. These results were
driven entirely by the disease-management component through reduced
health expenditures alone; disease management was not associated with a
significant reduction in absenteeism. Participation in the lifestylemanagement program was not associated with reduced expenditures or
absenteeism. 50
Evidence from meta-analyses and literature reviews:
A.

Baicker et al.

A widely cited meta-analysis published in 2010 by Katherine Baicker
and coauthors evaluated thirty-two peer-reviewed publications on wellness
programs and found strong positive returns on investment. 51 To be included
in the review, studies had to offer “well-defined” interventions, treatment
groups, and comparison groups, though comparison groups were not
always randomly assigned. The review does not distinguish between
“disease management,” “lifestyle management,” and hybrid programs.
Accounting for the cost of the programs—this is the analysis that
suggested wellness programs cost an average of $144 per employee per
year to administer—Baicker and colleagues reported an average ROI of
$3.27 with regard to direct health costs. 52 They also found a significant ROI
of $2.73 in reduced absenteeism. 53
The authors are careful to outline potential sources of bias that could
skew their findings; the authors raise concerns of selection bias and
publication bias throughout the paper’s introduction, results, and
discussion. 54 The voluntary nature of most wellness programs is a key
47.

Nyman et al., supra note 45, at 270-272.

48.

See id. at 278.

49.

Id.

50.

Id. at 276.

51.

Katherine Baicker et al., Workplace Wellness Programs Can Generate Savings, 29
HEALTH AFF. 1, 2 (2010).

52.

Id. at 4.

53.

Id.

54.

Id. at 1-6.
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source of potential selection bias: employees who participate in the
program may differ from the comparison group in important but
unobservable characteristics, such as individual motivation to lose weight
or quit smoking. The authors also stipulate that studies finding strong
positive returns for wellness programs may be more likely to be submitted
or accepted for publication than studies that demonstrate no impact. 55
Furthermore, the meta-analysis does not discern between lifestyle- and
disease-management interventions. 56
Many of the studies Baicker included are now twenty or more years
old—nineteen of the thirty-two papers were published before 1996—which
should give scholars pause in attempting to generalize findings to today’s
wellness programs. Advances in medical therapies may have diminished the
potential that wellness programs once had. As an example, John P.
Caloyeras and colleagues highlight that statins only achieved widespread
use for cholesterol control in the nineties. 57 Absent this therapy, early
wellness programs may have had a greater effect on health outcomes and
spending. 58
B.

Osilla et al.

One of the most comprehensive reviews to date was published to
accompany RAND’s 2012 Workplace Wellness Programs Study, sponsored
by the United States Departments of Labor and Health and Human Services
and commissioned as part of the Affordable Care Act. 59 The review,
published in the American Journal of Managed Care, included thirty-three
articles published after 2000, in contrast to the older studies evaluated by
Baicker et al. In order to be included in this review, studies had to be
published after 2000 and have a control or other comparison group. The
review focused on “comprehensive” wellness programs but did not treat
disease management and lifestyle management as distinct categories.
Seventeen of the thirty-three included studies were randomized controlled
trials (“RCTs”); ten of the remaining studies used observational designs, and
six had comparison groups that were not random in assignment. Ultimately,
the authors reported “mixed results” while raising questions about the rigor
of study designs. 60
Cumulatively, the included studies tested sixty-three wide-ranging
outcomes; this diversity makes it difficult to generalize lessons for any
particular domain. Each study evaluated one or more of the following:
55.

Id. at 6.

56.

MICHAEL BORENSTEIN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO META-ANALYSIS 377 (2009).

57.

Caloyeras et al., supra note 7 at 129.

58.

Id.

59.

Karen Chan Osilla et al., Systematic Review of the Impact of Worksite Wellness
Programs, 18 AM. J. MANAGED CARE e68, e68-69 (2012).

60.

Id. at e78.
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exercise, diet, physiological markers, healthcare costs, smoking,
absenteeism, mental health, and alcohol use. Most studies suggested that
wellness programs had positive effects, but the authors strongly qualify this
finding in the review. Studies with observational designs demonstrated
positive effects in about three-quarters of cases, substantially more than in
randomized controlled trials, which demonstrated positive effects in only
about half of cases.
Evidence on absenteeism and healthcare costs proved particularly
sparse. Only eight studies that evaluated health costs as an outcome met
the review’s inclusion criteria, and just one of those studies was an RCT,
which did not find an effect. The four observational studies that evaluated
absenteeism found positive effects—including one study that suggested a
return of $15.60 for every dollar spent 61—but no RCTs were available to
corroborate these findings rigorously. This limited body of evidence stands
in contrast to the volume of literature on healthcare costs and absenteeism
published before 2000.
Other critiques of the literature

Concerns with the methodological validity of the wellness literature
range beyond the selection bias and publication bias Baicker highlighted in
the 2010 review. Studies often have short time horizons—Osilla reported
that seventy percent of studies included had a follow-up of two years or
fewer 62—and failing to follow a study population for a sufficient period of
time could lead to either underestimates of the program effect if the
benefits take several years to accrue as health or financial outcomes or
overestimates if smoking cessation, weight loss, or other health gains lapse
in the long term, for example, or if there are diminishing returns that are
overwhelmed by administrative costs after some time.
A 2014 paper by Siyan Baxter and colleagues sought to determine
whether there was a relationship between wellness programs’ reported
returns on investment and the quality of study methodology in peerreviewed evaluations. 63 In order to assess study “quality,” the authors used
a thirty-six-item checklist developed by The BMJ, a general-medicine
journal. 64 The checklist contains questions about study design, data
collection, and analysis and interpretation of results. 65 The authors
conducted a sensitivity analysis for quality scoring by using two additional

61.

Steven Aldana et al., Financial Impact of a Comprehensive Multisite Workplace
Health Promotion Program, 40 PREVENTATIVE MEDICINE 131, 135 (2005).

62.

Osilla et al., supra note 59, at e78.

63.

Siyan Baxter et al., The Relationship Between Return on Investment and Quality
of Study Methodology in Workplace Health Promotion Programs, 28 AM. J. HEALTH
PROMOTION 347, 348 (2014).

64.

Id. at 349.

65.

Id.
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methodological—quality checklists, which resulted in similar relative—
quality scores.
In the review, Baxter reported that included studies generally reported
positive returns on investment, “evidenced in all instances except
randomized control trials.” The authors further reported that
methodological quality was a significant predictor of ROI; the lowest-quality
studies reported the highest ROI figures, while more rigorously evaluated
studies tended to report lower returns. 66
Even if we believe published findings to be methodologically sound, we
must contend with issues of generalizability. As Baicker and coauthors
remark in their review, the employers who are most likely to benefit from
a wellness program are the same ones who are most likely to be early
adopters of wellness programs. 67 Additionally, the studies included in the
reviews favor large employers; over ninety percent of employers in the
Baicker paper and over half in the Osilla review had over one thousand
employees. 68 It is not clear that success reported by large firms could be
easily replicated in smaller companies.
Studies offer little discussion of the broader context in which their
findings are rooted. Both the 1990s and recent years have seen trends in
insurance design that could confound study results if not accounted for
methodologically. In the 1990s, health-maintenance organizations
(“HMOs,” or “managed care”) gained popularity, resulting in narrower
networks and reduced health spending. 69 More recently, high-deductible
plans are increasingly prevalent among employer-sponsored insurance;
higher deductibles also tend to reduce utilization and spending. 70 A poorly
designed study might attribute spending reductions to wellness programs
when they are actually driven by secular changes in benefit design. Safeway
made this error, for example, when it attributed a spending slowdown to
its wellness program instead of a shift to greater employee cost-sharing.
In a 2013 Health Affairs paper, Jill Horwitz and coauthors proffered a
conceptual framework outlining the necessary conditions for a wellness
program to work as intended—by reducing costs by promoting health. 71
First, the authors stipulate, a given program must be successfully designed
to identify employees with targetable health risks; these employees must
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be more expensive to employers than those without health risks. 72 Next,
the incentives offered—typically financial in nature—must, in fact,
motivate employees to improve their health behaviors. 73 Lastly,
improvements in their health behaviors must necessarily lead to cost
savings for employers. The authors were not convinced that available
evidence firmly substantiates any of these assumptions, let alone all of
them. 74 Instead of improving employee health, the authors suggest,
wellness programs that rely on financial incentives may function by shifting
costs to employees with chronic health conditions, disproportionately
penalizing sicker employees. 75 In addition, to the extent that incentives shift
costs from employer to employee, wellness program evaluations might
overstate reductions in health spending.
Economically speaking, providing participation rewards is considered
equivalent to having penalties in place. Indeed, to the extent permitted,
employers might prefer the use of penalties over rewards—though
identical in a rational economic sense, empirical evidence has
demonstrated that penalties are more successful in inducing behavior
change than rewards. 76 Furthermore, the authors point out, as wellness
programs with incentives become more commonplace, we might expect
this financial risk to be distributed in a regressive fashion; many of the
chronic conditions’ risk factors of interest are disproportionately prevalent
among low-income and minority populations, as well as the elderly. 77
It is also worth highlighting the uneven distribution and “stickiness” of
health spending in general. Among the privately insured, under-sixty-five
population, the bottom fifty percent of spenders represented less than ten
percent of all health expenditures, while the top one percent of spenders
represent fourteen percent of spending. 78 Hirth and coauthors examined
the persistence of high spending in this population and found that about
one-third of spenders in the top ten percent remained in that decile five
years later. 79 This concentration of expenditures suggests that we should
expect broad-based wellness programs to be substantially less efficient
than programs designed to target high-cost individuals.
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V: WELLNESS PROGRAMS AND DISCRIMINATION
Setting aside their questionable efficacy, wellness programs are
difficult to reconcile with a number of federal laws that aim to restrict
employers’ ability to discriminate among their employees in the provision
of health insurance. After all, the point of wellness programs is to
discriminate. Those employees who adhere to the wellness program—
whether by filling out a detailed health assessment, taking a blood test, or
attending smoking-cessation courses—pay less for their health coverage.
Those who do not pay more.
HIPAA is the most prominent of the laws that discourage employers
from discriminating among employees. Because it prohibits employers from
crafting eligibility rules or adjusting a worker’s premiums based on “health
status-related factors,” 80 Congress had to exempt health-contingent
wellness programs from HIPAA in order to enable their adoption. 81 But
Congress has created no such exemption for a number of other laws—
including Title VII, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”),
and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)—that also discourage
discriminating among employees. Congress’s apparent enthusiasm for
wellness programs is thus in tension with its longstanding commitment to
equal treatment in the workplace. That tension has created challenges for
employers and for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”), which has primary responsibility for implementing
antidiscrimination laws.
Health assessments have been a recurring source of confusion. Such
assessments are often quite detailed and touch on sensitive subjects. At the
same time, employers often bring financial pressure to bear on employees
to fill them out. Penn State, for example, tried to impose a one-hundreddollar monthly insurance surcharge for failing to fill out a health assessment
that asked, among other things, “whether employees have recently had
problems with a supervisor, a separation or a divorce, their finances or a
fear of job loss; another question asks female employees whether they plan
to become pregnant over the next year.” 82 At a raucous faculty meeting,
covered in the New York Times, employees rebelled against requests to
share that information. 83
Although Penn State beat a hasty retreat, the episode brought to light
the tension between wellness programs and antidiscrimination law. Can
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health assessments be squared with laws that aim to protect workers from
discriminatory practices? Is it legal for employers to probe so deeply into
their employees’ medical histories?
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act

Offering incentives for employees to take health assessments does not
violate Title VII, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, religion,
national origin, age, or gender. 84 Incentives are questionable, however, for
health assessments that ask about pregnancy or family planning. The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) was enacted in 1978 to clarify that
Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination in the workplace also extends to
pregnancy-related discrimination. 85
By its terms, Title VII does not forbid employers from asking about an
employee’s pregnancy plans. 86 To be liable under the PDA, an employer
would have to fire the employee or otherwise take an adverse employment
action against her because of her pregnancy status. 87 Nonetheless, because
the fact that an employer has asked about pregnancy “may indicate a
possible intent to discriminate based on pregnancy,” the EEOC
“recommend[s] that employers avoid these types of questions.” 88 Many
wellness programs buck that advice, perhaps because they generally do not
share identifiable data with employers that might enable pregnancy
discrimination. 89 Time will tell if legal exposure or employee blowback leads
wellness programs to drop pregnancy-related questions from their health
assessments.
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act

In contrast to Title VII, GINA explicitly restricts what sorts of
information employers can solicit from their employees. Under GINA, an
employer may not “request, require, or purchase genetic information for
underwriting purposes.” 90 The EEOC has interpreted this provision to mean
that a refusal to disclose genetic information cannot affect how much an
84.
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employee pays for health coverage. 91 Because adherence to a wellness
program affects the cost of employer-sponsored coverage, employers
cannot offer a financial incentive for employees to complete a health
assessment requesting the disclosure of genetic information.
What is genetic information? In general, it is defined narrowly enough
to exclude conventional medical histories or screenings, which do not
inquire into the genetic basis for diseases. 92 Significantly, however, genetic
information includes the “manifestation of a disease or disorder in family
members of an individual.” 93 The reason is simple: a family member’s illness
may suggest a genetic propensity in the individual employee. So asking an
employee whether she has ever had breast cancer does not violate GINA,
but asking whether her sister or mother has ever had breast cancer does. 94
Yet, until recently, such questions were apparently common in health
assessments. 95
What about spouses? Because an employee’s spouse does not share a
genetic background with the employee, the spouse’s disease history is
unlikely to enable discrimination against the employee on the basis of her
genetic information. Plus, employers that offer family coverage have a
genuine financial interest in the health of their employees’ spouses. Some
employers, for example, have adopted wellness programs imposing a
substantial “tobacco surcharge” on employees with a spouse who
smokes. 96
Seeing no reason to prohibit the practice, the EEOC finalized a rule in
May 2016 “clarifying” that employers can offer substantial penalties—thirty
percent of the price of self-only coverage—in exchange for information
relating to a spouse’s manifestation of a disease or disorder. 97 Because the
average price of self-only coverage was $6251 in 2014, 98 an average
employee could face a penalty of up to $1875. These financial inducements
cannot be used to solicit any information about the diseases or disorders of
an employee’s children, since those may signal something about the
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employee’s own genetic information, 99 but information about a spouse’s
ailments is fair game.
The only problem is that the EEOC’s rule appears to contravene GINA.
The statute uses absolute language to prohibit employers from requesting
genetic information that will affect the rates that employees pay for health
coverage. 100 And the statute could not be clearer that genetic information
includes the “manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members of
an individual,” spouses included. 101 The EEOC cannot add an exception to
the statute because it believes it would be sensible to do so. It is not even
clear that the EEOC is correct that a spouse’s medical history raises
“minimal” risk of genetic discrimination against the employee. 102 That
history, for example, might suggest that the employee’s children, who may
be covered on her health plan, have a genetic predisposition to certain
diseases. That predisposition might tempt employers to discriminate
against the employee. Congress is free to guard against that risk, and it has
done so in GINA. The EEOC’s rule therefore appears vulnerable to legal
challenge from an employee who suffers a penalty for refusing to share her
spouse’s medical information.
Americans with Disabilities Act

The debate over asking about a spouse’s health status is a minor issue
when compared to the difficulties that the ADA poses for health
assessments. To avoid the risk of disability discrimination, the ADA prohibits
employers from conducing medical examinations of their employees,
including medical histories, unless they are “voluntary.” 103 Most health
assessments include detailed questions about employees’ medical
histories; as such, the ADA requires those assessments to be offered on a
voluntary basis.
99.
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That presents a conundrum. Can a health assessment be “voluntary” if
an employee faces a financial penalty for refusing to take it? In its 2016
rulemaking, the EEOC answered that question affirmatively, concluding that
ACA-compliant wellness programs do not violate the ADA. 104 Employers are
therefore free, under the rule, to offer inducements of up to thirty percent
of the cost of the employee’s coverage to encourage the completion of
health assessments. 105
Once again, however, the EEOC’s rule appears untenable. The agency
defends its interpretation with reference to the claim that the agency’s job
is “to provide as much consistency as possible” between the ADA and the
ACA. 106 In this, the EEOC could have in mind two different legal arguments.
Neither is compelling.
First, the EEOC might believe that the ACA implicitly created a safe
harbor from the ADA for practices that the ACA explicitly authorizes. The
intuition is that Congress would not have allowed employers to establish
robust wellness programs if most of those programs would violate the ADA.
Instead, Congress should be taken to have narrowed the scope of the ADA
when it comes to asking about medical histories.
A well-established rule of interpretation, however, holds that Congress
cannot be understood to repeal its prior handiwork by implication. 107 The
rule exists for good reason. Courts and agencies cannot repeal laws; only
Congress can do that. By the same token, courts and agencies cannot ignore
a duly enacted law just because they suspect a later Congress would have
preferred to do away with it. And who knows what Congress’s attitude was
toward the ADA? Congress may not have understood that wellness
programs raise concerns about disability discrimination. It is not at all clear
how Congress would have resolved the tension between the ACA and the
ADA had it considered the matter.
Until Congress clarifies matters, the proper approach is to say that the
ACA authorizes wellness programs only to the extent that they do not
violate the ADA. The statutes are not in irreconcilable conflict. Wellness
programs that discourage smoking, for example, will not run afoul of the
ADA since nicotine addiction is probably not a disability within the meaning
of the statute. 108 Similarly, wellness programs could drop their health
104. 81 Fed. Reg. 31126, 31132 (May 17, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630).
105. Id. at 31132.
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court ruled that no incentive, whatever its size, is enough to make a health
assessment involuntary. See EEOC v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., No. 14-CV-1019, 2016
WL 5107019, at *8 (Sept. 19, 2016) (“[E]ven a strong incentive is still no more than
an incentive; it is not compulsion”).
107. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 661 (2007).
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assessments in order to comply with the ADA. If that inhibits certain types
of wellness programs, it is up to Congress to come up with a fix, not the
EEOC.
Second, the EEOC might believe that, because the word “voluntary” can
be interpreted more or less restrictively, it is appropriate for the agency to
select the interpretation that fits best with other statutes, including the
ACA. That is true, as far as it goes: if at all possible, statutes enacted at
different times should be interpreted to cohere with one another. 109 To put
it in the language of administrative law, agencies can properly take into
account later-enacted statutes at the second step of Chevron. 110 But the
EEOC’s argument only works if the word “voluntary” is amenable to the
construction that the agency has created. If it is not, the EEOC cannot adopt
that interpretation, even if doing so would harmonize the ADA with the
ACA. In administrative law terms, such an interpretation would flunk
Chevron’s first step. 111 The question thus boils down to whether the EEOC
can reasonably say that a health assessment is still “voluntary” if there is a
substantial financial penalty for refusing to take it. Notice that the ACA has
no bearing on that inquiry. It is purely a question of the meaning of the ADA.
That is where the EEOC’s argument falls apart. The average premium
for a family plan in 2015 was $17,545; thirty percent of that is $5263. 112
Under the EEOC’s rule, then, an employer can dock an employee with family
coverage’s pay more than five thousand dollars if she refuses to undergo a
health assessment. No reasonable person would view a health assessment
as “voluntary” when backed by a draconian penalty. Indeed, until this latest
rule, the EEOC viewed any penalty as problematic; in enforcement
guidelines, the agency explained that an assessment was voluntary only “as
long as an employer neither requires participation nor penalizes employees
who do not participate.” 113 The agency is free, in rulemaking, to adjust its
understanding of what qualifies as voluntary. But it is not free to close its
eyes to the coercive effect of exorbitant financial penalties.
The EEOC’s rule is thus legally vulnerable. Whether it will be
successfully challenged remains to be seen, but Congress may ultimately
need to resolve the tension between its avid support for wellness programs
and its efforts to stamp out disability discrimination.
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VI: CONCLUSION
The evidence does not support the unbridled enthusiasm for wellness
programs that has swept the country. Some wellness programs that focus
on managing chronic illnesses may be effective, but the lifestylemanagement programs that are now ubiquitous in the American workplace
almost certainly are not. Reflecting the degree to which skepticism is borne
out by the empirical literature, wellness-industry executives are reportedly
reimagining the value proposition of their programs to de-emphasize return
on investment. 114
What is more, some of those programs appear to violate the ADA, at
least where their financial inducements leave employees with little
practical choice of whether to participate in a health assessment. Should
firms hope to use wellness programs to minimize healthcare spending, they
would do well to prioritize disease management over lifestyle management.
Similarly, insofar as the federal government aims to structure regulations
to support effective wellness programs, it should orient its policies to favor
disease management. No good reason exists for federal policy to support
the entrenchment and expansion of empirically unsubstantiated lifestylemanagement programs. In particular, the EEOC’s efforts to insulate
wellness programs from the ADA should be reconsidered; the financial
penalties that the ACA permits for an employee’s non-compliance with a
wellness program are so large that they cannot reasonably be viewed as
voluntary within the meaning of the ADA. Though the EEOC judges them to
be non-coercive, this is a departure from its prior view of financial penalties.
Even disease-management programs raise concerns. The durable
connection between employment and health coverage may make it
inevitable that employers will seek to become stewards of their employees’
health. But disease-management programs target employees with chronic
conditions, many of whom are disabled under federal law. The ADA likely is
not an impediment to such programs: it prohibits “classifying” disabled
workers in a way “that adversely affects the[ir] opportunities or status,” 115
and it is hard to see how a wellness program that rewards the chronically ill
for participating “adversely” affects them. But even if the law is no obstacle,
many people find it unsettling that employers can interfere in their disabled
employees’ private medical decisions. Firms assertively entering the
disease-management space may give rise to the specter—whether or not it
gives rise to the corresponding reality—that employers could predicate
other decisions upon employee health. The rise of such concerns may
provide even more reason to question the wisdom of linking coverage to
employment.
The evidence favoring disease-management programs is not
conclusive. In the Medicare population, in particular, such programs do not
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appear to have met with consistent success. 116 The Congressional Budget
Office evaluated major demonstration projects in care coordination and
disease management in Medicare, and none has achieved spending or
quality targets. 117 One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that
findings from the elderly Medicare population do not generalize well to
working-age Americans who have access to insurance through their
employers; perhaps chronic conditions, targeted at earlier stages, are more
responsive to intervention and management. Alternatively, diseasemanagement strategies offered by employers may be different and more
effective than interventions in the Medicare demonstrations. Or it is
possible that the studies finding strong return on investment for employers’
disease-management efforts were anomalies. These areas are ripe for
future research.
Ultimately, however, the evidence on wellness programs is
discomfiting. Most programs do not work; some raise serious legal
concerns. It is time for employers and policymakers to rethink their
enthusiasm for the wellness movement.
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